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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, Kareem Serageldin was sentenced to imprisonment for
thirty months for conspiracy to falsify books and records of a financial
institution.1 Serageldin participated in a scheme to inflate the value of
mortgage-backed securities owned by the Credit Suisse Group as the
subprime credit crisis escalated in 2007 and 2008.2 The offense carried a
maximum sentence of five years imprisonment and a maximum fine of
$250,000 or two times the gross pecuniary gain or loss associated with the
offense.3 The sentencing guidelines called for a prison sentence in the
range of fifty-seven to sixty months, plus supervised release.4 However,
Judge Hellerstein sentenced Serageldin to thirty months imprisonment and
imposed a fine of $150,000—staying far below the presumptive
sentencing guidelines.5 He determined that Serageldin deserved a lighter
sentence because Serageldin was working in a climate in Credit Suisse
where such wrongdoing was routine.6 Despite receiving a lighter sentence
than anticipated, Serageldin still experienced an extraordinary fall from
grace. A graduate of Yale University, earning almost seven million dollars
a year at the height of his career, he subsequently spent his nights in a
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1. Sentencing Hearing at 51, United States v. Serageldin, 1:12-CR-00090 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5,
2013). See generally Complaint, Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Serageldin, No. 1:12-CV-0796 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
1, 2012), 2012 WL 286878.
2. Complaint at 1, Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Serageldin, No. 1:12-CV-0796 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1,
2012), 2012 WL 286878.
3. Pleading Hearing at 10, United States v. Serageldin, No. 1:12-CR-00090 (S.D.N.Y. May 10,
2013).
4. Id. at 9.
5. Sentencing Hearing at 51, 55, United States v. Serageldin, 1:12-CR-00090 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5,
2013).
6. Id. at 9.
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prison cell the size of a basketball court with seventy others.7 Serageldin
also earned the dubious distinction of being the only banker who was jailed
for having some role in causing the financial crisis in the United States.8
Acknowledging Serageldin’s lack of previous criminal convictions and
low chance of recidivism, Judge Hellerstein mused, “[T]here’s a
deepening mystery in my work: Why do so many good people do bad
things?”9
Why did Serageldin do it? This Article uses the Serageldin case as a
vignette to highlight some of the complexities regarding the motivations
of white-collar criminals, the importance of organizational culture in
creating situational conditions for wrongdoing, and structural explanations
for white-collar crime. Serageldin’s story both supports and contradicts
various aspects of individual, organizational, and structural explanations
for crime. In order to better understand Serageldin’s case, this Article
engages in a multi-level analysis of explanations by integrating existing
theories, highlighting areas of disagreement and opposing views, and
demonstrating that some explanations are more valuable than others.
Moreover, though, based on a single case study, there is methodological
strength in focusing on the psychosocial processes which impact the
individual, particularly when the data available for analysis is sufficiently
rich as to allow for various complex narratives about this wrongdoer’s role
in criminality.10
This Article draws on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
(SEC) complaint against Serageldin, the transcript for his plea hearing, and
the transcript for his sentencing hearing.11 The SEC’s complaint provides
a prosecutorial account of the fraud. It also includes actual extracts from
Serageldin’s recorded phone calls at Credit Suisse which provide a realtime narrative of the fraud. The court transcripts detail Serageldin’s own
account of the fraud and give a biographical account of Serageldin’s life,
provided by his mother, who offered character evidence on his behalf.
7. Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-jailfinancial-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/L76L-GYAL].
8. Henry N. Pontell, William K. Black & Gilbert Geis, Too Big to Fail, Too Powerful to Jail?
On the Absence of Criminal Prosecutions After the 2008 Financial Meltdown, 61 CRIME L. & SOC.
CHANGE 1, 1 (2014).
9. Sentencing Hearing at 28, United States v. Serageldin, 1:12-CR-00090 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5,
2013).
10. Shadd Maruna & Amanda Matravers, N=1: Criminology and the Person, 11 THEORETICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 427, 427–29 (2007).
11. See generally Complaint, Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Serageldin, No. 1:12-CV-0796 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 1, 2012), 2012 WL 286878; Sentencing Hearing, United States v. Serageldin, 1:12-CR-00090
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2013); Pleading Hearing, United States v. Serageldin, No. 1:12-CR-00090
(S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2013).
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These perspectives allowed for the recasting of the SEC’s account of the
fraud and reframed it in light of Serageldin’s personal circumstances,
casting the banker as the fallen hero of his own narrative.12 The
significance of these narratives is less in their content and more in the way
they are told; they may have allowed Serageldin to deceive himself about
the extent of his involvement in the fraud and his motivations for
committing it. The narratives locate his individual decision within a
corporate culture where wrongdoing was seemingly routine and within the
structural context of a crashing securities market. Therefore, these
contemporaneous and post-hoc accounts of the fraud are valuable because
they facilitate the problematization of the causal explanations of this crime
along individual, organizational, and structural lines of analysis.
I. THE SERAGELDIN CASE AS A VIGNETTE: “PEOPLE ARE EXPECTING US
TO MAKE MONEY”
Kareem Serageldin was the Global Head of Structured Credit
Trading at Credit Suisse. He had a reputation for working long hours and
living modestly, earning himself the nickname “the investment banking
monk.”13 The son of Egyptian immigrants of modest means, he overcame
adversity and excelled in his studies. He completed a bachelor’s degree in
mechanical engineering at Yale University. By the age of 33, he was
earning $7 million a year as the Global Head of Structured Credit Trading
for Credit Suisse. According to the SEC, he was also the architect of a
massive fraudulent scheme to mismark mortgage-backed securities as the
subprime credit crisis escalated in 2007 and 2008, hiding losses to make
the securities appear more valuable than was really the case. The SEC
alleged that Serageldin conspired with David Higgs, the Head of Hedge
Training, and two New York-based traders who reported to Serageldin,
Faisal Siddiqui and Salmaan Siddiqui. Serageldin and Higgs were UK
residents but traveled to New York regularly—where the bulk of the
violations occurred. The scheme appears to have commenced in August
2007 and concluded in January 2008—though Serageldin disputed the
point at which he became involved in the fraud, among other matters. The
fraud persisted, according to the SEC, because “accurately recording the
decline in value would cause hundreds of millions of dollars of losses,
vaporize Defendant[’s] hopes for multi-million dollar year-end bonuses

12. See generally Celia Moore, Always the Hero to Ourselves: The Role of Self-Deception in
Unethical Behavior, in CHEATING, CORRUPTION, AND CONCEALMENT: THE ROOTS OF DISHONESTY
98 (2016).
13. Eisinger, supra note 7.
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and, in the case of Serageldin, imperil a highly-coveted promotion.”14 The
fraud unfolded as follows.
Traders must price or mark the securities they hold on their books at
the same time every day to record their value in a fair, accurate, and
consistent way. Credit Suisse reported the results in accordance with U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and adopted
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 (SFAS 157). SFAS
157 requires that securities be marked at a price that they can be sold at
between market players on the measurement date. Traders should comply
with this requirement by looking at the prices received for identical
securities in an active market, or in the absence of those, quotes for
identical or similar securities in inactive markets (where, for example,
such securities are not often traded, and less information is available).
Traders should also consider information from Credit Suisse’s trading
desks. Traders must fairly report the price that can be achieved at the
current time of measurement, not the likely price that can be achieved at a
later date when a bond matures, even where the market is significantly
depressed or in turmoil at the time of measurement.
In August 2007, the credit markets were increasingly distressed, and
traders in subprime mortgages were required to consult the ABX index—
which benchmarks the value of these products according to the year in
which they are issued. The SEC alleged that as the market deteriorated,
Serageldin and Higgs were worried about AAA-rated bonds backed by
subprime mortgages, which they held in a trading book called ABN1. A
reduction in the value of ABN1 would cause enormous losses because the
portfolio contained $3.5 billion in securities. Until August 2007, the prices
of securities in the ABN1 book were automatically priced by a service
called the Financial Times Interactive Data (FTID). Subsequently, a new
system was implemented to provide senior management with real-time
price reports for securities. As a result, Serageldin and Higgs started to
more actively monitor the prices of securities to reach daily and monthly
P&L goals.
The SEC extensively detailed how and when the securities were
falsely remarked. For example, on August 29, 2007, when the FTID prices
were downloaded to the ABN1 spreadsheet, the prices showed a loss of
$75 million. Higgs, Salmann Siddiqui, and a trading assistant manually
changed the prices of the securities several times on a trial and error basis
to reduce the loss, with Salmaan Siddique noting, “Hopefully this should
get us something close to what we need.”15 Recordings of the phone calls
14. Complaint at 2, Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Serageldin, No. 1:12-CV-0796 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1,
2012), 2012 WL 286878.
15. Id. at 12.

2020]

Why Do Good People Do Bad Things?

529

with Credit Suisse revealed the efforts to mismark the securities to inflate
their value:
Trading Assistant: I’m just putting those prices in, I just wanted to
warn you it’s not going to make what you think it’s going to
make . . . I think basically if we put them in we probably make around
$200,000.
Salmaan Siddiqui: Oh, God!
Trading Assistant: Which was not what you were expecting . . . 16

Another recording on August 31, 2007, showed how the traders were
attempting to hit performance targets; the trading assistant told Siddique
that they were “going to need quite a bit more P&L . . . . Overall, in ABN
we’re currently down about 25 now . . . David [Higgs] said we can’t be
more than a couple down in ABN.”17
The SEC argued that the defendants were routinely mismarking
securities by September 2007, when “Serageldin frequently
communicated to Higgs the specific P&L outcome he wanted.”18 The SEC
also detailed how profits on securities from other books were being used
to offset losses from the ABN1 book, which had been artificially marked
up to unrealistic levels. In another recorded phone call on September 13,
2007, a trading assistant and Serageldin discussed moving prices to best
suit their needs:
Trading Assistant: We’ve got 10 bucks [million] in RCV [another
book]. We had a big [P&L] number but with Dave [Higgs] and Faisal
we’re using it to write down some positions in ABN.
Serageldin: Which positions?
Trading Assistant: Just some bonds that were overpriced and to remark the CMBX index to where it is. If you want it [P&L] to be a big
number let me know what you want, then I’ll just go through it with
Dave [Higgs], because obviously I can move things back to where
they were.
Serageldin: If we made a lot of money it would be nice to take it, once
in a while.19

On a subsequent occasion on October 17, 2007, Serageldin was
recorded telling Higgs that P&L must be adjusted again because senior
management expected him to make money from his trades, stating: “I want
16. Id.
17. Id. at 13.
18. Id. at 15.
19. Id. at 16.
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to be up a little bit of money today, because everyone’s going to think
we’re going to be up and be very surprised if we’re not.”20 The team
continued to mismark the value of the securities in November and
December, and Serageldin, fearing detection, acknowledged in another
recorded phone call that the P&L was overvalued at year-end:
Serageldin: The dollar prices of our floating rates and fixed rates
honestly are quite high, right?
Higgs: I agree they are quite high.
....
Serageldin: Why can’t we lower the dollar prices on that stuff?
Higgs: They definitely should be marked down.
Serageldin: We should mark these down because someone is going
to spot this. On the fixed rates we have some room, but not on the
floating rates, we don’t. On the other desk, right, the floating rate, the
bonds are marked below the index.21

However, on January 7, 2008, Serageldin subsequently approved the
year-end prices without adjusting them downwards. In a call to Higgs two
days later, Serageldin indicated that the mismarking was necessary
because management expected him to generate high earnings from his
books, stating, “People are expecting us to make money. [The head of
Credit Suisse Group’s investment bank] knows what our positions are.
Today, we have to be up at least 10 bucks [million]. . . . I know it’s hard
when you’ve got things that aren’t necessarily quite marked where they
need to get marked.”22
On February 12, 2008, Credit Suisse reported a net income of $7.12
billion for the year 2007 and $1.16 billion in earnings for the fourth quarter
of that year.23 Within days, detecting that the defendants had materially
misstated the values of their securities, Credit Suisse announced on
February 19, 2008, that its statement of earnings was inaccurate.24 A
subsequent report on March 20, 2008, restated a reduction in earnings for
2007 in the amount of $2.65 billion.25 The ABN1 book was written down
by $1.3 billion, approximately half of the overall losses. That same day,
Credit Suisse announced that it fired or suspended the traders who had

20. Id. at 17.
21. Id. at 23–24.
22. Id. at 24.
23. Id. at 25.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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mismarked the securities.26 Serageldin was subsequently prosecuted in the
Southern District of New York for mismarking securities. He pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to falsify books and records of a financial institution
before Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein on April 12, 2013. The offense carried
a maximum sentence of five years of imprisonment and a maximum fine
of $250,000 or two times the gross pecuniary gain or loss associated with
the offense. The sentencing guidelines indicated that a prison sentence of
fifty-seven to sixty months and a fine of $10,000 to $100,000 was
appropriate. Judge Hellerstein, however, sentenced Serageldin to thirty
months imprisonment and fined him $150,000. Serageldin achieved
infamy as the only banker in the U.S. to go to jail for having some role in
the financial crisis.27
II. WHAT MOTIVATES WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS?: “I LOVED MY JOB”
Gottfredson and Hirschi argue that crime is the result of a lack of
self-control28 that arises when an individual’s bond with society is
broken.29 Strong self-control results in better academic performance and
greater career prospects, while a lack of self-discipline among offenders
from an early age may result in the commission of a crime. While some
studies link corporate executives with longer patterns of criminal
offending,30 other empirical work suggests that white-collar criminals
demonstrate great discipline in their studies and in their careers. For
example, Wheeler et al. conclude that white-collar criminals tend to have
more stable employment histories and higher educational attainment than
that of ordinary criminals or the general public.31 Similarly, Benson and
Moore conclude that white-collar criminals were less than half as likely to
have a previous criminal conviction as ordinary criminals and that they
were more likely to do well academically and be more socially adjusted.32
Unlike Gottfredson and Hirschi, Benson and Moore conclude that whitecollar criminals have moderate self-control and that opportunity, macrosocial, economic, and organizational processes lead to crime.

26. Id. at 26.
27. Eisinger, supra note 7.
28. See generally MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF
CRIME (1990).
29. See generally TRAVIS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY (1969).
30. See generally Robert Davidson, Aiyesha Dey & Abbie Smith, Executives’ “Off-the-Job”
Behavior, Corporate Culture, and Financial Reporting Risk, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2015).
31. STANTON WHEELER, KENNETH MANN & AUSTIN SARAT, SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE
SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 70 (1988).
32. See Michael L. Benson & Elizabeth Moore, Are White-Collar and Common Offenders the
Same? An Empirical and Theoretical Critique of a Recently Proposed General Theory of Crime, 29 J.
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 251, 260, 263 (1992).
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In the corporate context, the key is not that an individual’s link to
society is broken, but rather to what extent that individual’s connection to
the company is maintained. Research suggests that individuals who have
strong interpersonal attachments, investment in their careers, involvement
in their work, and loyalty to the goals of the organization are less likely to
commit white-collar crimes.33 The issue of organizational context, or
corporate culture, is discussed further in the second part of this article.
Perhaps, however, the problem is not individual self-control per se, but
instead the lack of institutional and regulatory controls, which gives rise
to the lack of supervision, interventions, and oversight that eventually lead
to adverse consequences. This macro-structural issue is discussed further
in the third part of this article.
Scholars have also long since thought that committing a crime
involves the logical weighing of benefits and burdens. Bentham argued
that if the punishment is greater than the perceived benefit of the crime,
the potential offender will be deterred. He stated, “[T]he evil of the
punishment must be made to exceed the advantage of the offense.”34
Becker developed this theory in a modern context.35 Crime, he suggested,
is an economically important activity, and people are rational utility
maximizers. Becker reasoned:
A person commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds
the utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other
activities. Some persons become ‘criminals,’ therefore, not because
their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because
their benefits and costs differ.”36

Becker also rejected “ad hoc concepts of differential association, anomie, and the like.”37 Instead, he noted that the calculation depended,
among other things, on the probability of detection, apprehension, conviction, and form of punishment. Offenders do not need to be perfectly ra-

33. James R. Lasley, Toward a Control Theory of White-Collar Offending, 4 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 347, 348 (1988).
34. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325 (Richard Hildreth trans., Trübner & Co.
2d ed. 1871).
35. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968).
36. Id. at 176.
37. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 46 (1976); see Anthony
Bottoms & Andrew Von Hirsch, The Crime-Preventive Impact of Penal Sanctions, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 97, 106 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010).
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tional calculators for this theory to work; they may exercise “bounded rationality” so that they understand costs and benefits as they apply to their
ways of thinking and beliefs.38
Soltes argues that although white-collar criminals are thought to
mindfully weigh the costs and benefits of their actions when deciding to
commit crime, his personal correspondence with white-collar prisoners
demonstrates that they are rarely so rational in practice.39 He suggests,
“They seem to have reached their decisions to commit crimes with little
thought or reflection. In many cases, it was difficult to say they had ever
really ‘decided’ to commit a crime at all.”40 It was not that they were
worried they would get caught, he suggests, but that they simply did not
consider that they were doing anything harmful.41 This view is not peculiar
to the white-collar crime context; other empirical research suggests that
the vast majority of ordinary criminals give little or no thought to getting
caught or punished.42 Nevertheless, some scholars continue to use the costbenefit analysis in seeking to explain why people commit white-collar
crimes. For example, in the U.S., where “law and economics’ theories
have come to dominate academic literature on enforcement,”43 many
scholars expansively employ this theoretical lens to consider behavioral
issues relating to the motivations, personalities, temperaments, and senses
of identity of the offenders.44
Other work has focused more specifically on the individual
personalities and traits of white-collar criminals to explain their
motivations behind committing crimes. Some scholars suggest that whitecollar criminals tend to be irresponsible and prone to risk-taking.45 It is
suggested that in general, white-collar criminals are more hedonistic,
narcissistic, and conscientious than non-criminal managers,46 though
others have determined less conscientiousness among employees who

38. See EUGENE SOLTES, WHY THEY DO IT: INSIDE THE MIND OF THE WHITE-COLLAR
CRIMINAL 104 (2016).
39. Id. at 93–98.
40. Id. at 6.
41. Id.
42. David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the Pickpocket’s
Hanging, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 295, 308 (2002).
43. CHRISTOPHER HODGES, LAW AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR: INTEGRATING THEORIES OF
REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS 56 (2015).
44. See generally, e.g., Claire Hill, Towards (More) of an Understanding of Criminal—and
Merely Bad—Corporate Conduct, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN IRELAND LAW AND POLICY 33 (Joe
McGrath ed., 2019).
45. See, e.g., Judith M. Collins & Frank L. Schmidt, Personality, Integrity, and White Collar
Crime: A Construct Validity Study, 46 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 295 (1993).
46. See generally Gerhard Blickle et al., Some Personality Correlates of Business White Collar
Crime, 5 APPLIED PSYCHOL.: AN INT’L. REV. 220 (2006).
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engage in theft.47 Other scholars have suggested that white-collar criminals
usually exhibit “Type A” personalities, so they are often intelligent,
impatient, competitive, and financially motivated.48 In a study conducted
by Bucy et al. in which they interviewed a variety of white-collar crime
experts, including former prosecutors, 77.8% of respondents agreed that
white-collar criminals fall into the categorization of leader and follower.49
Other respondents noted that white-collar criminals sometimes find
themselves in small schemes that escalate out of control.50 Leaders are
thought to be Type A personalities: intelligent, arrogant, cunning,
successful, prone to take risks, aggressive, narcissistic, determined, and
charismatic. The respondents stated, almost unanimously, that the main
motivating factor for leaders who commit crimes is greed.51 Other
motivating factors include a sense of entitlement, arrogance,
competitiveness, and rationalization. Followers who commit crimes are
considered weak, convinced of their cause, acting out of loyalty to the
leader, or out of fear of losing their jobs. In contrast to leaders, followers
are less confident, less aggressive, and more gullible. Others note that
white-collar criminals are likely to be charismatic,52 exercise a desire to be
in control,53 or have “a sense of superiority bordering on narcissism.”54 In
some cases, they act because they fear the loss of their status and
reputation.55
The SEC’s complaint indicates that Serageldin was a leader in the
scheme to mismark securities at Credit Suisse. The complaint concludes
that the “defendants’ fraudulent scheme was initiated by Kareem
Serageldin.”56 This is evidenced by numerous occasions where Serageldin
instructed his subordinates, David Higgs, Faisal Siddique, and Salmaan
47. Arno R. Kolz, Personality Predictors of Retail Employee Theft and Counterproductive
Behavior, J. PROF. SERV. MKT., Oct. 1999, at 107.
48. Rebecca T. Elliott, Examining the Relationship Between Personality Characteristics and
Unethical Behaviors Resulting in Economic Crime, 12 ETHICAL HUM. PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 269
(2010).
49. Pamela H. Bucy et al., Why Do They Do It?: The Motives, Mores, and Character of White
Collar Criminals, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 401, 405 (2008).
50. Id. at 406.
51. Id.
52. Katherine A. DeCelles & Michael D. Pfarrer, Heroes or Villains? Corruption and the
Charismatic Leader, 11 J. LEADERSHIP & ORG. STUD. 67, 69 (2004).
53. See Sally S. Simpson & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Low Self-Control, Organizational Theory,
and Corporate Crime, 36 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 509, 510 (2002).
54. Bucy et al., supra note 44, at 416 (citing David Litterick, Rich-But by No Means Beyond the
Dreams of Avarice, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 19, 2005, at 33).
55. Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 252–53 (1999).
56. Complaint at 2, Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Serageldin, No. 1:12-CV-0796 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1,
2012), 2012 WL 286878.
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Siddiqui, to mismark the values of securities, clearly indicating that
Serageldin played a prominent role in orchestrating the scheme. The
complaint states, “Serageldin frequently communicated to Higgs the
specific P&L outcome he wanted. Higgs, in turn, directed Faisal Siddiqui
or Salmaan Siddiqui to mark the book in a manner that would achieve the
desired P&L.”57 The SEC suggested Serageldin was financially motivated
because the decline in the value of the securities, in the absence of
mismarking, “[W]ould cause hundreds of millions of dollars of losses,
vaporize Defendant’s hopes for multi-million dollar year-end bonuses and,
in the case of Serageldin, imperil a highly-coveted promotion.”58 Quoting
Serageldin, the SEC argues that he responded to expectations from higherups to generate profit: “Serageldin stated that he needed a more favorable
P&L result because senior management expected him to make money: ‘I
want to be up a little bit of money today, because everyone’s going to think
we’re going up and be very surprised if we’re not.’”59 On another occasion,
Serageldin stated that “people are expecting us to make money. [The head
of Credit Suisse Group’s investment bank] knows what our positions are.
Today, we have to be up at least 10 bucks [million].”60 These forms of
performance pressures—the need to “hit the numbers,” meet growth
targets, and respond to organizational pressures—are well established as
reported causal explanations for white-collar crime.61
Contrary to the views of the SEC, Serageldin explained that neither
money nor a promotion motivated him; instead, Serageldin insisted, “The
motivation, your Honor, was to protect my reputation at the bank. At the
time there was a lot of market turmoil, so I was protecting my reputation
in the bank.”62 The court seemed skeptical of this explanation because
losses were widespread at Credit Suisse, so Serageldin could not have
suffered any more reputational loss than anyone else. Serageldin’s view,
however, was that he was particularly admired for his ability to navigate
turbulent market conditions. He noted, “[W]ithin the bank I had a
reputation to be able to manage these positions in a very difficult market
while everyone else was losing money . . . I was trying to maintain that
reputation.”63 He explained that it was not about money. Furthermore, this
57. Id. at 15.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id. at 17.
60. Id. at 24.
61. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME: THE ROLE OF MIDDLE
MANAGEMENT (1983); James W. Coleman, Toward an Integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime, 93
AM. J. SOC’Y 406 (1987); Vikas Anand et al., Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation
of Corruption in Organizations, 18 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 39, 40 (2004).
62. Pleading Hearing at 20, United States v. Serageldin, No. 1:12-CR-00090 (S.D.N.Y. May 10,
2013).
63. Id. at 21.

536

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:525

book with inflated market valuations was merely one of approximately
thirty that he oversaw, and the mismarking constituted less than five
percent of the trades he supervised. The inflation of the book did not
translate to substantially increased earnings for him. Counsel for
Serageldin was keen to differentiate Serageldin’s case from other
mismarking cases in which traders tried to hide ever-greater mounting
losses, preserve their profitability to garner compensation, or affect a
particular position tied to a big payout for a trader. Credit Suisse withheld
$25 million in compensation from Serageldin, $20 million of which was
deferred compensation for work completed prior to the mismarking in
question ever began. Serageldin claimed he lost far more than he could
ever have hoped to gain.
Contrary to the SEC’s complaint and the audio recordings,
Serageldin also claimed he was not the architect of the mismarking; he
was a follower, not a leader. According to Serageldin, he discovered
mismarking was already taking place, and if anything, followed his staff
into the misconduct. In particular, Serageldin argues that he became aware
some traders under his supervision were mismarking their positions when
he received a report in late 2007 that aggregated data showing weighted
average prices for books of securities.64 Serageldin claims he suspected
there was a significant gap in the valuations in the report and the price the
bonds could actually be sold for in the market. Serageldin joined the
conspiracy:
After learning that these men [the other defendants] had been
mismarking Credit Suisse’s records of certain bonds at inflated levels
above where they could be sold in the market . . . I allowed it to
continue, and I agreed to allow additional false records to be
generated. I joined the conspiracy in the hope of concealing the
mismarks and the devaluation of these bonds.65

As such, Serageldin described his role in the fraud in passive terms.
He learned of the fraud, allowed it, followed it, and joined it, but he did
not lead it. Nevertheless, the court was also skeptical of Serageldin’s
claims on this point. If white-collar criminals are either leaders or
followers, Judge Hellerstein determined:
[H]e was a leader, and when things are run around you, there’s no
necessity for the leader to follow suit. Someone has got to stand up
for what’s right. And when he doesn’t stand up for what’s right, when

64. Id. at 17–18.
65. Id. at 13.
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a person doesn’t do what’s right and starts doing criminal things, he’s
a criminal.66

It is not entirely clear, however, notwithstanding the court’s view that
mismarking was systemic in Credit Suisse, whether the bank was actually
willfully blind to the mismarking in the Serageldin case. The court noted,
for example, that the bank could have compared the mismarked book
against other books to see that there was inflation.67 Pursuing this line of
inquiry further, the court asked Serageldin if it was clear whether the bank
knew that the bonds were mismarked, stating: “[Y]ou must have believed
that management would either have accepted the deception or closed their
eyes to the deception?”68 The court also asked why the auditors had not
caught the mismarking.69 Serageldin appeared evasive in his replies: “I do
not know why the process did not capture the mismarks. I guess the
process was an imperfect process . . . .”70 Serageldin explained that the
traders recorded the market value of their positions at the end of each day
without any objective evidence of the valuations, noting, “[I]t is the sayso of the trader and there is obviously some subjectivity in the matter.”71
Serageldin’s evasiveness on this point may stem from the fact that he was
downplaying his attempts to frustrate Credit Suisse’s protocols to reduce
the risk of detection.
Serageldin’s strategies to circumvent Credit Suisse’s protocols are
detailed in the SEC’s complaint, which demonstrated that Serageldin was
clearly calculating in his decision-making processes to mismark the
securities. For example, in order to resist scrutiny from the Price Testing
group at Credit Suisse, which reviewed the valuations assigned to
securities by traders, the defendants requested third party dealers to verify
their prices. These assessments, however, were not independent because
the dealers merely valued the securities at prices that the defendants
themselves requested.72 On another occasion, the SEC noted that
“Serageldin instructed Higgs and another trader to select four positions
that Price Testing could not test and to increase the prices on those
positions ‘to make back the money’ that Price Testing was questioning.”73
66. Sentencing Hearing at 9–10, United States v. Serageldin, No. 1:12-CR-00090 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
5, 2013).
67. Pleading Hearing at 18, United States v. Serageldin, No. 1:12-CR-00090 (S.D.N.Y. May 10,
2013).
68. Id. at 15.
69. Id. at 15–16.
70. Id. at 16.
71. Id. at 17.
72. See Complaint at 13–15, Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Serageldin, No. 12-CV-0796 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
1, 2012), 2012 WL 286878.
73. Id. at 21.
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Furthermore, when the securities had been priced too high, Serageldin
stated: “We should mark these down because someone is going to spot
this.”74 It is also clear, according to the SEC, that Serageldin and his coconspirators knew they were engaging in wrongdoing. The SEC stated:
By the end of 2007, Defendants were in possession of ample market
data showing that their bonds were grossly overvalued. Despite freely
discussing that “housing was going down the tubes,” and
acknowledging that their bonds were overpriced and should be
marked down, Defendants kept the bonds priced at falsely high levels
at year-end.75

All of this, the SEC noted, showed that Serageldin knew that what
he was doing was wrong and that by attempting to deceive the bank and
reduce his risk of detection he was clearly calculating in his decisionmaking processes.
Serageldin managed, however, to paint a very different picture of his
decision-making processes. Echoing Soltes’s view that white-collar
criminals do not seem to give much thought or reflection to the
wrongdoing, Serageldin claimed that he didn’t consider the costs or
benefits of his actions. It seemed, in fact, that it had never occurred to
Serageldin that he would ever commit a crime. Serageldin stated, “Your
Honor, today is the most difficult day of my life. I never imagined I would
be standing here awaiting sentencing for a crime.”76 He acknowledged that
when he realized the mismarking were occurring, “the right thing to do
would have been to stop, correct and address the misconduct. I recognize
that this was a crucial moment of my life and I see that I failed miserably
in the decisions I made at this time.”77 Moreover, Serageldin’s submission
to the court, and that of his mother, allowed him to show that he did not
seem to share the negative personality traits most associated with leaders
or white-collar criminals, though it was clear he was intelligent and
determined. At just thirty-three years of age, Serageldin was managing his
team at Credit Suisse, a position that came with a lot of responsibility. This
achievement was even more impressive because Serageldin came from a
family of immigrants and felt he had to work harder than everyone else to
get to the same position and to be accepted. To provide insight to her son’s
character, Serageldin’s mother explained that the family moved from
Egypt to America when Serageldin was six years old. The family struggled
to make ends meet, and Serageldin internalized the importance of hard
74. Id. at 23.
75. Id. at 3.
76. Sentencing Hearing at 45, United States v. Serageldin, 1:12-CR-00090 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5,
2013).
77. Id. at 46.
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work. Bullied at school, Serageldin felt he had to work twice as hard as
everyone else to receive the respect and approval of his peers. It was not
about money, but about “winning that respect and approval that were so
hard, the acceptance that were so hard to come by as he was growing up.”78
These explanations resonated with the court. Judge Hellerstein
stated, “I too am a son of immigrants who came to the United States to
find an opportunity that they never would have had had they not
immigrated.”79 Moreover, contrary to the explanatory factors outlined by
Gottfredson and Hirschi, Serageldin exercised considerable self-control
from a young age. Serageldin also acknowledged, “I always believed by
working harder than anyone I could succeed at almost anything. That was
the case throughout my education, as well as my time at Credit Suisse. I
was proud of the reputation I built at the bank. Your Honor, I loved my
job.”80
III. “A SMALL PIECE OF AN OVERALL EVIL CLIMATE”: WHAT ROLE
DOES ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE PLAY?
In an attempt to explain why people commit crime, some experts
have examined the role that society plays. Sutherland, an early pioneer in
the study of white-collar crime, argued that crime was a learned behavior.
Within intimate social groups, there is a process of communication and
learning by interaction, through which people share their motivations,
drives, and rationalizations.81 Various rewards and punishments, including
financial incentives, reputational issues, and power, may also influence
behavior.82 This theory was called differential association because it
specified that the tendency to commit crime depended on the frequency
and intensity of associations with other criminals.83 Cressey further
developed the theory in an empirical study of embezzlers.84 He noted that
embezzlers generally encountered financial difficulties that could not be
shared but which could be solved privately in a manner which could be
78. Id. at 44.
79. Id. at 45.
80. Id. at 45–46.
81. Ross L. Matsueda, Differential Social Organization, Collective Action, and Crime, 46 CRIME
L. & SOC. CHANGE 3, 5 (2006); Joe McGrath, ‘Walk Softly and Carry No Stick’: Culture, Opportunity,
and Irresponsible Risk-Taking in the Irish Banking Sector, 17 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 86 (2020)
[hereinafter McGrath, Walk Softly and Carry No Stick].
82. See generally Robert L. Burgess & Ronald L. Akers, A Differential AssociationReinforcement Theory of Criminal Behavior, 14 SOC. PROBS. 128 (1966).
83. See generally EDWIN HARDIN SUTHERLAND & DONALD RAY CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY (8th
ed. 1970); EDWIN HARDIN SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY (4th ed. 1947); EDWIN
HARDIN SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949).
84. See generally DONALD RAY CRESSY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY; A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF EMBEZZLEMENT (1953).
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verbalized as compatible with their own standards of morality. Cressey’s
work demonstrated that wrongdoing is not necessarily the result of
belonging to a criminally deviant subgroup or being immersed in a
criminal environment; those engaged in wrongdoing will often be law
abiding, as will their colleagues, but they rationalize or “neutralize” their
wrongdoing.85 In Cressey’s study, embezzlers were more likely to tell
themselves that they were just borrowing the money, that the money was
really theirs anyway, or that their actions were aberrations that did not
define them. They neutralized their conduct not merely to explain it, but
to explain it away.86 Langevoort has observed that this form of
rationalizing or neutralizing wrongdoing is not uncommon in
“organizational hierarchies.”87 Cressey’s tripartite classifications of
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization were subsequently developed
into an internationally prominent model known as the fraud triangle, which
has since been adapted and developed further to explain various forms of
fraud not restricted to embezzlement.88
Cultures of either compliance with or resistance to regulation
develop within companies.89 With regard to the latter, Clinard and Yeager
argue that the key to understanding how the corporate environment creates
conditions for criminality is to drop the fiction that the corporation is a
person and to embrace the reality that it is a complex organization where
responsibility is diffused and fragmented.90 The organization is
“criminogenic” when its internal structures, rather than people’s
personality traits or motivations, play some part in generating crime.
Drawing on empirical work on tax evasion and anti-competitive
practices,91 Needleman and Needleman say that systems are crime
coercive when they compel people to commit crimes for corporate profit
“in which the individual system member is essentially a pawn, with few
choices and few defenses against criminogenic pressures.”92 In his
empirical work, Clinard determined that middle managers were most
85. See generally DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT (1964).
86. See generally Nicole Leeper Piquero & Michael L. Benson, White-Collar Crime and
Criminal Careers, 20 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 148 (2004).
87. Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853, 874 (1995).
88. See generally David Carson & Barry Robinson, Corporate Investigations, in WHITE COLLAR
CRIME IN IRELAND: LAW AND POLICY 49–73 (Joe McGrath ed., 2019).
89. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
90. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 272 (1980).
91. See William N. Leonard & Marvin Glenn Weber, Automakers and Dealers: A Study of
Criminogenic Market Forces, 4 L. & SOC’Y REV. 407, 407 (1969). See generally Harvey A.
Farberman, A Criminogenic Market Structure: The Automobile Industry, 16 SOC. Q. 438 (1975).
92. Martin L. Needleman & Carolyn Needleman, Organizational Crime: Two Models of
Criminogenesis, 20 SOC. Q. 517, 520 (1979).
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likely to be influenced by the ethical standards set by top management,
and that middle managers responded to the pressures exerted by top
management. Ethical standards were compromised in order to sustain
profits and reduce costs. Pressure may come from above to perform well
for the company so that “[u]ndue corporate pressures upon middle
management may lead to their becoming engaged in illegal or unethical
behavior.”93
Research has led experts to have a better understanding of how
cultural immersion can influence people and how people respond to
authority. Asch’s perception-based study showed that individuals were
willing to give obviously incorrect answers to simple tasks, subjugating
their decision-making processes due to a group dynamic.94 In Milgram’s
famous experiment, participants were willing to administer severe electric
shocks, on instructions from an apparently legitimate source,
demonstrating that people were often willing to compromise their own
moral standards and follow authority.95 In the Stanford Prison Experiment,
Zimbardo demonstrated that situational contexts and group dynamics
facilitated the commission of torture of prisoners by guards.96 In doing so,
Zimbardo displaced “the long-held notion of the ‘bad apple’ with that of
the ‘bad barrel’: the idea that the social setting and the system contaminate
the individual, rather than the other way around.”97 Subsequent research
has questioned the ethical underpinnings of these studies,98 and the ability
the replicate the results,99 though the conclusions remain generally
accepted.100 Moreover, other empirical work has demonstrated that even
when behavior is directed to serve organizational goals, information about
wrongdoing is not always shared with the top brass in companies, so that
the knowledge of crime or unethical behavior is pushed down in

93. MARSHALL BARRON CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME: THE ROLE OF MIDDLE
MANAGEMENT 22 (1983) (italics omitted).
94. Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of
Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP, AND MEN: RESEARCH IN HUMAN RELATIONS 222–36 (H.
Guetzkow ed., 1951) (More recent efforts to replicate the test suggest, however, that the results are
unstable.); Marie-France Lalancette & Lionel Standing, Asch Fails Again, 18 SOC. BEHAV. &
PERSONALITY INT’L J. 7 (1990).
95. See generally THOMAS BLASS, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE
MILGRAM PARADIGM (2000).
96. PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007).
97. YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING STATES’ ABILITY TO
REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR 49 (2018).
98. See Ian Nicholson, Torture at Yale: Experimental Subjects, Laboratory Torment and the
“Rehabilitation” of Milgram’s “Obedience to Authority”, 21 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 737 (2011).
99. Lalancette & Standing, supra note 94.
100. Teresa C. Kulig, Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Revisiting the Stanford Prison
Experiment: A Case Study in Organized Skepticism, 28 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 74 (2017).
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organizations, along with the responsibility for it.101 This is especially true
when top executives pressure middle-management into achieving
particular results, while being willfully blind as to how those results are
achieved.102
The corporate structure may still facilitate crime even when the
crimes damage the goals of the organization. This is likely to occur when
the steps to prevent or control crime are considered more damaging to the
organization than the wrongdoing itself. In those circumstances, crimes
are “an unwelcome but unavoidable cost of doing business.”103 Within the
securities industry, for example, Needleman and Needleman see:
a market pattern in which flow is everything, and the intrinsic value
of the basic commodity almost irrelevant. . . . More importantly,
whatever losses they occasionally suffer through fraud (limited by
insurance in any case) are less significant in terms of total profit than
the benefits of keeping the overall flow of commerce unimpeded.104

If corporate culture can compel or tempt people into committing
white-collar crime, there is also the possibility that ambitious people, with
a high tolerance for risk-taking and little regard for corporate ethics, prefer
to work for firms with a criminogenic culture.105 People may “self-select”
themselves to work in those companies.
In Serageldin’s case, Judge Hellerstein determined that mismarking
in Credit Suisse was a routine part of the corporate culture there. Judge
Hellerstein stated:
He was in a place where there was a climate that made it conducive
to what he did. The bank was, as you call it, mismarking, but showing
false profits much more extensively than Mr. Serageldin was doing.
Mr. Serageldin’s role was a small piece of an overall evil climate
within the bank and with many other banks.106

According to the prosecution, the overstatements Serageldin oversaw
amounted to one hundred million dollars, a small portion of the $2.65
billion in losses that Credit Suisse misstated.107 A subsequent report later

101. ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988).
102. J. S. Nelson, Disclosure-Driven Crime, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487 (2018).
103. Martin L. Needleman & Carolyn Needleman, Organizational Crime: Two Models of
Criminogenesis, 20 SOC. Q. 517, 521 (1979) (italics omitted).
104. Id. at 524 (italics omitted).
105. Robert Apel & Raymond Paternoster, Understanding “Criminogenic” Corporate Culture:
What White-Collar Crime Researchers Can Learn from Studies of the Adolescent Employment–Crime
Relationship, in THE CRIMINOLOGY OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 15–33 (2009).
106. Sentencing Hearing at 9, United States v. Serageldin, 1:12-CR-00090 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5,
2013).
107. Id. at 37–38.
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concluded that the over-statement was actually closer to $37 million,108
“slightly more than one percent of the bank’s total restatement.”109 Even
working with the $100 million figure, Judge Hellerstein concluded “that
there was either a terrible climate in the bank because people tend to know
what other people are doing. And Mr. Serageldin’s crime, and it is a crime,
was a crime that was duplicated by many others in many other
departments.”110 On this basis, the Court refused to order any restitution
for Credit Suisse, the apparent victim in the case. Judge Hellerstein stated,
“I think the bank, having created a climate in which Mr. Serageldin has
operated and not having shown to what extent, if at all, the bonuses paid
to him would not otherwise have been paid, is not entitled to restitution.”111
IV. “THE ONLY PERSON SINGLED OUT IN A CRIMINAL CASE FOR . . . THE
CREDIT CRISIS”—WHAT STRUCTURAL FACTORS INFLUENCE
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME?
Having outlined individual and environmental explanations, this
section considers structural factors in crime causation. Some theorists
argue that the structure of society is itself dysfunctional, and that this
produces dysfunction at a micro level.112 For example, Wacquant has
concluded that structural factors offer the best explanations of crime,
arguing that “hyper-ghettoes” emerged in the USA because of changes
over the course of the late twentieth century to the labor market (when
factories moved abroad and respectable working-class jobs became more
elusive), housing policy (which concentrated social housing and social
disadvantage in particular communities), and welfare policy (which did
not provide enough to live on) over the course of the late twentieth
century.113 These changes on the macro or “structural” level impacted how
people lived in disadvantaged communities, drawing attention to “the role
of the state as a stratifying and classifying agency that wields a dominant
influence on the social and symbolic order of the city.”114
Similarly, in a detailed case study on organizational wrongdoing,
Vaughan argued that the explosion of NASA’s space shuttle, Challenger,
108. Eisinger, supra note 7.
109. Todd Haugh, The Most Senior Wall Street Official: Evaluating the State of Financial Crisis
Prosecutions, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 153, 163 (2014).
110. Sentencing Hearing at 38, United States v. Serageldin, 1:12-CR-00090 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5,
2013).
111. Id. at 53–54.
112. See generally WILLEM A. BONGER, CRIMINALITY AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS (1916).
113. LOÏC WACQUANT & JOHN HOWE, URBAN OUTCASTS: A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY OF
ADVANCED MARGINALITY (2008).
114. Loïc Wacquant, Urban Desolation and Symbolic Denigration in the Hyperghetto, 73 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 215, 215 (2010).
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was “socially organized and systematically produced by social
structures . . . embedded in the banality of organizational life.”115 In that
case, production pressures and economic constraints which arose from the
broader political environment combined with managerial wrongdoing to
induce a series of incremental mistakes; risk-taking and danger became
normalized, institutionalized, and aligned with organizational goals. In
doing so, Vaughan “shifts our attention from individual causal
explanations to the structure of power and the power of structure and
culture—factors that are difficult to identify and untangle yet have great
impact on decision making in organizations.”116 As recognized by
Vaughan, to understand why people commit white-collar crimes, “we
must conceptualize individual action within its layered context—Persons
as actors, the organization as a system of action, and the environment as
the system of action within which the organization acts.”117 In this section,
macrostructural factors are discussed as giving rise to an environment
where there was a lack of effective supervision, intervention, and
oversight, in which the Government created the conditions for
irresponsible risk-taking in the banking sector.
In relation to white-collar crime, the structural factors which
influence white-collar crime may include the lack of regulation, the wide
use of alternatives to punishment, and the valorization of the economy in
neoliberal societies, among others.118 Deregulation, a lack of credible
regulatory oversight, inadequate corporate governance, and poor risk
management have been identified as structural causes of the financial
crash in the US.119 The deregulatory movement and its policies have a long
historical trajectory, taking hold in the 1970s and 1980s when the
importance of the New Deal restrictions and the impact of the Great
Depression were no longer felt as keenly, ultimately triggering another
boom-bust regulatory cycle. The separation of commercial and investment
banking created by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was weakened in the
1980s and 1990s through expansive interpretations of the “business of

115. DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE,
xiv (1996).
116. Id. at xv.
117. Diane Vaughan, The Macro-Micro Connection in White-Collar Crime Theory, in WHITECOLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 124, 125 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992).
118. JOE MCGRATH, CORPORATE AND WHITE-COLLAR CRIME IN IRELAND: A NEW
ARCHITECTURE OF REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT (2015).
119. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: THE FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT] (including dissenting
views).
AND DEVIANCE AT NASA, at
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banking” by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),120 in
part by pressure exerted by the banking industry,121 before being repealed
by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, considered by some to be a
significant factor contributing to the financial crash.122 Restrictions on the
geographical operations of banks were also loosened and lifted; banks
were able to form branches with greater ease within and across state
lines.123 The erosion of interstate banking restrictions combined with the
erosion of the Glass-Steagall constraints led to the merger and acquisition
of banks into what is now known as systemically important financial
institutions.124
Moreover, legislative measures like the Tax Reform Act in 1986,
which had already begun in the 1970s, facilitated a process known as
securitization. This process allowed banks to sell their loans to Special
Purpose Vehicles which bundled debts together to sell as securities,
backed by assets like mortgages, the kind Serageldin was selling.125 These
mortgage backed securities were thought to be particularly safe products
because they diffused the risk of default among many parties and credit
rating agencies that provided positive evaluations of them, not least
because underwriters could shop around for the best rating.126
In 2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act allowed for the
“over the counter” dealing of derivatives (contracts whose values were
derived from other assets, securities, etc.) so they could be sold privately
among traders and not on an exchange, thereby inhibiting transparency
and oversight from regulators.127 Though derivatives had long since been
a feature of the financial services landscape, the existing market in
derivatives grew and a new type of derivative, the credit default swap,
proliferated. This allowed investors to ‘insure’ against the risk of default
120. S.T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the Business of
Banking, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2008).
121. See Robert S. Plotkin, What Meaning Does Glass-Steagall Have for Today’s Financial
World, 95 BANKING L.J. 404 (1978).
122. Author E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates
and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 973 (2008).
123. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, What Drives Deregulation? Economics and
Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions, 114 Q. J. ECON. 1437 (1990).
124. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 119, at 52–53.
125. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, 41 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 261, 270 (2010).
126. Lawrence White, Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 220–21
(2010).
127. The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry
Commission, 111th Cong. 9–10 (2010) [hereinafter The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis]
(statement of Michael Greenberger, Law School Professor, University of Maryland School of Law),
https://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0630-Greenberger.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/644R-KL5A].
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on a loan in return for a premium. Investors were swapping or hedging that
risk in return for making a payment, which allowed them to limit their
exposure, and to speculate further.128 These derivatives would “allow
market actors to take positions that magnify losses, heighten risk
concentration in the financial system, raise the vulnerability in the
financial system, and raise the vulnerability of interconnected financial
firms to cascading liquidity and counterparty credit problems.”129
Moreover, banks were highly leveraged because they funded themselves
more through short-term debt that could be withdrawn by providers in a
deteriorating market, thereby creating conditions for a run.130
Meanwhile, some have argued that government policies helped fuel
a property bubble, premised on fragile security, and ultimately contributed
to a credit crisis.131 For example, the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1992 placed a positive obligation on government
sponsored entities (GSEs), like Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac, to support the
mortgage market and finance affordable home ownership by buying
mortgages from lenders so they could use these funds to give more loans.
The legislation required GSEs to buy a percentage of mortgages provided
to low- and middle-income borrowers. The Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) set these targets, raising them from 42% in
1997 to 50% in 2001 and again to 55% in 2007.132 In addition,
underwriting standards fell so that loans were increasingly given without
proper supporting documents from the borrower (liar loans), or were given
to borrowers who had no income, job, or assets (NINJA loans).133
Commenting on the fragile security underpinning these loans, the FCIC
would later comment, “As a nation, we set aggressive homeownership
goals. . . . Yet the government failed to ensure that the philosophy of
opportunity was being matched by the practical realities on the ground.”134
In addition, after the 911 terrorist attacks and the bursting of the dot-com
bubble, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates to stimulate the economy and
encourage home sales with “mortgage interest rates that are at lows not
seen in decades . . . .”135

128. See id. at 11–14.
129. Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. REG. 91, 93
(2012).
130. See generally ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 427–60
(2014).
131. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 119, at xxii.
132. Id. at 183.
133. See id. at 512.
134. Id. at xxvii.
135. The Economic Outlook: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee, 107th Cong.
(2002) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve System),

2020]

Why Do Good People Do Bad Things?

547

Gathering these threads together, the government facilitated
deregulation and eroded the division between commercial and investment
banking so that banks could not just garner earnings arising from the
interest on mortgages, but could also securitise and trade those mortgages
for greater profit. The government, through its various branches, lowered
interest rates to encourage mortgage lending; encouraged banks to lend to
borrowers of modest means at higher risk of default; and permitted,
through the absence of regulation, dispensation of mortgages through
weak underwriting standards. Gerding has called this phenomenon the
regulatory instability hypothesis, a context in which “strong forces act to
decay financial regulations at the precise moment when they are most
needed—when markets boom, investors and financial institutions exercise
less care and take on more risk and leverage, and financial crisis looms.”136
It was at this moment that regulations were needed the most because
banks, in turn, seem to have used subprime mortgages of questionable
creditworthiness as collateral for highly leveraged securities that were
marketed as exceptionally creditworthy, thereby transforming “a sow’s ear
into a silk purse.”137 When the property market subsequently declined in
the mid-2000s, and people defaulted on their mortgages, credit rating
agencies downgraded mortgage-backed securities, and banks lost billions
on those assets. It was in this context that Serageldin found himself in 2007
and early 2008, under pressure to generate profits while trading assets
which were declining in value.
In addition to the state of the financial services sector, the manner in
which supervision and enforcement activities are conducted is also
important. Credible oversight and enforcement can increase the risk of
detection of wrongdoing and may discourage wrongdoers from engaging
in irresponsible risk taking in the financial services sector.138 Enforcement
is also contingent on the social, political, and economic context which
prevails at that time.139 Unsurprisingly, perhaps, a political context which
favors light-touch regulation will also impact the relative intrusiveness of
regulators and their approaches.140 For example, the Chairman of the
Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006, Alan Greenspan, was known for
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2002/20021113/default.htm [https://perma.cc
/E5U2-V8WN].
136. GERDING, supra note 130.
137. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financialcrisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ [https://perma.cc/CUE5-CVM3].
138. McGrath, Walk Softly and Carry No Stick, supra note 70.
139. Joe McGrath, Regulating White-Collar Crime in Ireland: An Analysis Using the Lens of
Governmentality, 72 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE, 445 (2019).
140. See Roman Tomasic, The Financial Crisis and the Haphazard Pursuit of Financial Crime,
18 J. FIN. CRIME 7, 11 (2011).
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favoring light-touch regulation, having argued that leaving the market to
its own devices was in itself a form of regulation, used that proposition in
public speeches to ask if Government intervention did more harm than
good.141 It is the SEC, however, that maintains a more central role in
enforcing federal securities laws. In doing so, it is known for preferring
compliance-orientated strategies to punitive ones and tends to view
referrals for criminal prosecution as a last resort.
Research into the SEC’s enforcement practices has long since noted
its preference for addressing cases internally, and a reluctance to refer
cases for prosecution.142 This preference for civil and administrative
sanctions is understandable; they provide fast ways of addressing harm
and resolving problems, allow the SEC to resolve cases without resort to
the criminal justice system, and involve lower levels of proof and evidence
than required in criminal cases. It has been found, however, that “the
misdeeds most vulnerable to criminal sanctions are also most likely to
escape legal action entirely[,]” raising questions as to whether the SEC
addresses wrongdoing proportionately and effectively.143 In addition, a
recent empirical analysis of SEC civil and administrative enforcement data
from 2005–2007 found that individuals in big firms fare better in
enforcement actions than those in smaller firms because (1) the actions
taken against large entities are less likely to be accompanied by
enforcement actions against individuals, and (2) because individuals at big
firms face less punitive sanctions.144 It “demonstrates a systematic lack of
action against individual violators in high-profile cases . . . ,”145 again
raising the question of whether its enforcement actions are optimal in
deterring misconduct.
Recent criticisms have questioned why the SEC did not detect the
major multi-billion fraud committed by Bernie Madoff, notwithstanding
numerous warning signs.146 Others have criticized its “abject failure to
monitor the financial crimes and shenanigans engaged in by investment
141. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the
Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta: Government Regulation and
Derivative Contracts (Feb. 21, 1997), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1997/
19970221.htm [https://perma.cc/7X44-MCTH].
142. Susan P. Shapiro, The Road Not Taken: The Elusive Path to Criminal Prosecution for
White-Collar Offenders, 19 L. & SOC’Y REV. 179, 182 (1985).
143. Susan P. Shapiro, Collaring the Crime, Not the Criminal: Reconsidering the Concept of
White-Collar Crime, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 346, 360 (1990).
144. Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against
Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 728 (2012).
145. Id. at 683.
146. See generally U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION
OF THE FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME, REPORT OIG-509
(2009).
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banks and other irresponsible entities whose reckless behavior collectively
triggered what has become known as ‘the Great Economic Meltdown.’”147
In its defense, the SEC has protested that it operated with smaller budgets
in the lead-up to the crisis but was expected to oversee an expanded
securities market with more complex financial operations. Testifying
before Congress, the Chairperson of the SEC, Mary Schapiro, stated:
The agency has suffered a significant decline in staffing levels, due
to several years of flat or declining budgets. Between 2005 and 2007,
the agency lost 10 percent of its employees . . . . Yet as the SEC staff
has declined, the securities markets grew dramatically. For example,
since 2005 the number of investment advisers registered with the
Commission has increased by 32 percent and their assets under
management have jumped by over 70 percent (to now more than $40
trillion).148

The DOJ, which monopolizes the power to criminally prosecute
federal crimes at the federal level, has also been criticized for addressing
the wrongdoing arising from the financial crisis through negotiated
settlement agreements rather than criminal prosecutions.149 Despite
appearing remarkably punitive due to the very high financial penalties
secured in these agreements, these settlements have been severely
criticized for failing to deliver individual accountability and for lacking
sufficient judicial oversight. Garrett has noted that “[i]n about two-thirds
of the cases involving deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements
and public corporations, the company was punished, but no employees
were prosecuted.”150
The general reluctance to prosecute bankers for the financial crash
has precipitated academic discussion and comparisons with criminal
justice responses to financial crises in the past. For example, while
deregulatory policies and a lack of credible oversight are identified as
common factors in the financial crisis of 2008 and the S&L crisis in the
1980s, the S&L crisis generated a stiff criminal justice response, unlike
147. Gilbert Geis, Unaccountable External Auditors and Their Role in the Economic Meltdown,
in HOW THEY GOT AWAY WITH IT: WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS AND THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 85–
103 (Susan Will, Stephen Handelman & David C. Brotherton eds., 2012).
148. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government by
Chairman Mary Schapiro, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Mary Schapiro, Chairman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts031109mls.htm
[https://perma.cc/R6TU-URUY].
149. See Steven Arons, David McLaughlin & Greg Farrell, Deutsche Bank Completes $7.2
Billion U.S. Mortgage Pact, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-01-17/doj-deutsche-bank-agrees-to-pay-7-2b-for-misleading-investors [https://perma.cc/2AU87VJ7].
150. BRANDON GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS 13 (2014).
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the recent financial crisis.151 As noted by Pontell et al., “[T]he savings and
loan crisis of the 1980s resulted in over a thousand convictions of thrift
executives and others at, or near the top of the corporate food chain.”152
Serageldin, however, appears to have been the only banker of any seniority
to have been prosecuted for any role in the financial crisis of 2008, and
even then, some have suggested that he was, at best, a middle manager in
Credit Suisse.153
Counsel for Serageldin also noted that few other cases of wrongdoing
arising from the financial crisis appear to have been detected and
prosecuted by the Department of Justice. This trial was an exceptional one
“[b]ecause he is really by some counts the only person that has been
singled out in a criminal case for what some people call the credit crisis,
financial crisis . . . .”154 Counsel for Serageldin observed “that he may go
to prison here today is a huge unwarranted disparity to what the other
people who likely were mismarking portfolios across Wall Street and
maybe, as your Honor observed, within Credit Suisse.”155 The Court was
unimpressed with this argument, noting: “It reminds me of five robbers
complaining that the sixth did not get caught.”156 His counsel countered,
“In this point, Mr. Serageldin is the sixth robber. The other five seem to
have gotten away.”157 Serageldin is not the villain of the piece, but rather,
the victim of a broader structural context, prosecuted “for something that
happened when the credit world sort of came down around Mr.
Serageldin’s head . . . .”158
In summation, this section sought to locate individual acts and
organizational culture within the broader regulatory environment. In
particular, it noted the argument, well canvassed in the literature, that the
State created the conditions for Serageldin’s fraud because legislative
initiatives eroded the separation of commercial and investment banking.
In the past, banks had generated profit from interest on mortgages, but now
they could securitize those mortgages and earn much higher profits from
trading them. Deregulatory initiatives weakened the SEC and resourcing
issues constrained its operations. Low interest rates set by the Federal
151. Henry N. Pontell, William K. Black & Gilbert Geis, Too Big to Fail, Too Powerful to Jail?
On the Absence of Criminal Prosecutions After the 2008 Financial Meltdown, 61 CRIME L. & SOC.
CHANGE 1, 6 (2014).
152. Id.
153. See Todd Haugh, The Most Senior Wall Street Official: Evaluating the State of Financial
Crisis Prosecutions, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 153, 155 (2015).
154. Sentencing Hearing at 11, United States v. Serageldin, No. 1:12-CV-0796 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
5, 2013).
155. Id. at 19.
156. Id. at 20.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 19.
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Reserve helped to stimulate a housing boom, and the government
encouraged banks to give loans to those of more modest means,
stimulating the subprime market. Weaker underwriting standards were
permitted so that mortgages were offered to those at an increased risk of
being unable to repay the loan. The level of supervision and oversight by
regulatory authorities was low, and individuals in large institutions were
unlikely to be punished severely and very unlikely to be prosecuted.
It is in this broader structural context that Serageldin found himself
in 2007 and early 2008. He was trading mortgage-backed securities as the
subprime crisis escalated. He experienced personal and organizational
pressure to generate profits while trading assets that were declining in
value. He mismarked assets in the hopes that he might trade his way out
of difficulties. Broader macro-level forces informed micro-level decisions
made by Serageldin as an individual working in an organization. In this
context, “the competitive environment creates the structural impetus for
misconduct; organizational characteristics provide opportunities; and the
regulatory environment, systematically failing because of structurally
engendered constraints, encourages individuals to respond to competitive
pressures by taking advantage of the socially organized opportunities for
deviance that are available in organizations.”159 This is not to say that
individuals do not exercise power in making their own choices. For
example, though they may have experienced competitive pressures
differently, some people at Credit Suisse did not mismark securities
despite working in the same context as Serageldin. Nevertheless, this
section illustrates how white-collar crime can be informed by a macrolevel context, such that dysfunction at a broader regulatory level trickles
down to organizational and individual levels.
CONCLUSION
Legal scholars have long since recognized that the “good man” and
the “bad man” have different reasons for obeying the law.160 Holmes
suggested that the good man will obey the law because he thinks it’s the
right thing to do, but the bad man “who cares nothing for an ethical rule
which is believed and practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to
care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep
out of jail if he can.”161 He continues,
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as
a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
159. Diane Vaughan, The Macro-Micro Connection in White-Collar Crime Theory, in WHITECOLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 124, 127 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992).
160. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
161. Id. at 459.

552

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:525

knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his
reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the
vaguer sanctions of conscience.162

While most scholarship is concerned with the bad man, some
scholarship, particularly in the field of compliance, considers matters from
the perspective of the good man. Some people will obey the law simply
because it is the right thing to do, “not because they calculate that the costs
of crime exceed its benefits; crime is simply off their deliberative
agenda . . . .”163 It is also recognized that some people will obey the law
when they think it is fairly applied and maps onto their values.164 Feldman,
for example, suggests that there are two types of good people who break
the law. First, there are the good people who deceive themselves into
genuinely believing that their actions are not wrongful or immoral.
Second, there are people who know what they are doing is wrong but can
rationalize their wrongdoing to preserve their views of themselves as
generally law-abiding people. These two types of good people exhibit
different levels of self-awareness and different motivations for complying
with the law.165
Serageldin does not appear to conform to the idea of a “bad man”
who obeys the law because he fears punishment. From his own
perspective, it seems that he never really thoughtfully considered the costs
and benefits of his actions, that he did not consider getting caught, or even
that he was consciously thinking that he was committing crimes. He
describes himself as a driven, diligent worker who does not lack selfcontrol. He said he was not motivated by profit but committed his crimes
to protect his reputation in Credit Suisse as someone who could navigate
turbulent financial conditions with relative ease.
Moreover, Serageldin was strongly influenced by the context and
culture in which he was immersed, in which Credit Suisse arguably made
insufficient efforts to detect apparently widespread and routine
mismarking. Misconduct was made easier by structural issues: not caused
by a bad apple, but by a bad barrel. Serageldin’s wrongdoing within Credit
Suisse took place within a broader deregulatory or light-touch regulatory
environment, which disfavored intrusive, harsh enforcement, and that
generated the conditions for dysfunction at individual and organizational
162. Id.
163. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 94 (Harris, Hawkins, Lloyd-Bostock & McBarnet eds., 1992).
164. See generally CHRISTOPHER HODGES, LAW AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR: INTEGRATING
THEORIES OF REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS (2015); TOM R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006).
165. See YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING STATES’ ABILITY TO
REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR 140 (2018).

2020]

Why Do Good People Do Bad Things?

553

levels. Some suggest that culture is neither what is written into policy
documents, nor how people interpret those policies in practice; culture is
what happens when no one is watching. If so, this raises the question of
whether Credit Suisse was willfully blind to its inner workings, thereby
creating generative conditions for crime. The importance of this
observation is that it reminds us that crime is not aberrational; good people
can do bad things when those things are routinized, rationalized, and
networked as normal. Moreover, when operating within a culture where
wrongdoing is routine and regulatory controls are insufficient, wrongdoers
may not be able to accurately evaluate both why they did such actions, or
to fully appreciate the unethical nature of those actions so that they
maintain their positive images of themselves as moral, law-abiding
persons. In regard to other aspects of their lives, they may really be those
persons. At the time Serageldin committed his crimes, he seemed to
recognize that his actions were unethical, that he made mistakes, and that
he exercised poor judgment, but he also sought to explain how his chronic
pattern of offending was aberrational. He falls within Feldman’s second
classification, the good man who knows his conduct is wrong but seeks to
rationalize, neutralize, and explain it away.

